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I. INTRODUCTION
In June 2015, the Colorado Supreme Court ("Court") decided two cases
involving ditch rights and water rights. On June 1, the Court's Frees v. Tidd
decision upheld issuance of a conditional water right decree for hydropower
use to the owner of land burdened by a ditch.' On June 29, the Court's St
Jude's Ildecision disallowed issuance of an absolute water right to the owner of
a ditch for flow-through aesthetic, recreation, and piscatorial uses without impoundment.! Both decisions harken back to the Court's 2001 St Jude'sIdecision involving the nature, scope, and operation of ditch rights within the design
of constitutional and statutory rights for use of the public's water resource
II. THE WATER TRILOGY PROVISIONS OF COLORADO WATER LAW
A ditch is a conveyance structure for transporting a portion of the public's
water resource, lawfully appropriated for beneficial use, to its place of use as
defined in Colorado's Constitution and statutes. The Colorado Constitution's
water trilogy provisions establish: (i) the public owns the water within Colorado
and it is subject to appropriation by governmental entities and private persons;'
*
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1. Frees v. Tidd, 349 P.3d 259, 268 (Colo. 2015).
2. SLJude's Co. v. Roaring Fork Club, L.L.C., 351 P.3d 442, 451 (Colo. 2015), hereinafter

St.Jude's I.
3. Roaring Fork Club, L.P. v. St.Jude's Company, 36 P.3d 1229, 1231 (Colo. 2001), hereinafter St. Jude's I
4. Colo. Const. art. XVI, § 5 ("The water of every natural stream, not heretofore appropriated, within the state of Colorado, is hereby declared to be the property of the public, mad the

WA TER LA WREVIEW

Volume 19

(ii) the right to divert the unappropriated waters of the natural stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied;5 and (iii) all persons and corporations shall have
the right to construct ditches across the lands of others for the conveyance of
water. Since the 1858 Gold Rush, Colorado has grown up through the conjunction of ditch rights and water-use rights.!
No more eloquent statement about this truth exists than a justice Rebecca
Kourlis passage in the S1. Jude's Idecision. She invokes the 1861 Territorial
Legislature's very first action, which established prior appropriation rights, disavowed riparian-based water rights, and instituted the right of ditch construction
for conveyance of water from a stream to its place of beneficial use:
Ditches are important to Colorado. They permit a landscape, economy, and
history in which fertile valleys prosper. Without them, properties adjacent to
or distant from water courses wither. Colorado is not a riparian state in which
only those lands adjacent to the streams and rivers have rights to water. Rather,
as early as the tenure of the territorial legislature, our lawmakers recognized
that our arid climate required the creation of a right to appropriate and convey
water across the land of another so the lands not immediately proximate to
water could be used and developed.8
Neighborly disputes about and along ditches resonate in Colorado's history,
and its land and water laws. If St. Jude be the patron saint of lost causes, let us
not lose the lesson the Roaring Fork - recreational versus St. Jude's - irrigation
conflict taught. Herein play the inter-workings of Colorado's constitutional and
statutory water underpinnings. Our newer economies are more dependent than
ever upon maintenance of our traditional economies.
H. WHAT IS NOT A BENEFICIAL USE RIGHT
In St.Jude's I, the Roaring Fork Club ("Club") unilaterally altered ditches
that historically ran irrigation water for St. Jude's Ranch ("Ranch") use.' The
Club "excavated within Ranch's rights-of-way, graded, and destroyed ditch
banks and portions of ditches, realigned ditch channels, diverted ditch water
flows, piped portions of ditches, constructed cabins and golf course greens
within the easements, and temporarily piped wastewater into one of the

same is dedicated to the use of the people of the state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter
provided").
5. Colo. Const. art. XVI, § 6 ("The right to divert the unappropriated waters of any natural
stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied").
6. Colorado Const. art. XVI, § 7 ("All persons and corporations shall have the right-of-way
across public, private and corporate lands for the construction of ditches, canals, and flumes for
the purpose of conveying water for domestic purposes, for the irrigation of agricultural lands, and
for mining and manufacturing purposes, and for drainage, upon payment of just compensation");
see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-86-102, (2015) ("Any person owning a water right or conditional
water right shall be entitled to a right-of-way through the lands which lie between the point of
diversion and point of use or proposed use for the purpose of transporting water for beneficial
use in accordance with said water right or conditional water right").
7. See, e.g., ROBERT R. CRIFASI, A LAND MADE FROM WATER, APPROPRIATION AND THE
EVOLUTION OF COLORADO'S LANDSCAPE, DITCHES, AND WATER INSTrrUTIONS (2015) (centering on nineteenth century settlers' construction and operation of Boulder County ditches).
8. St Jude's1, 36 P.3d at 1231-32 (citing Colorado Territorial Laws 67, Section 2 (1861)).
9. Id. at 1230.
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ditches.""
The Court rejected the Club's self-help trespass upon St. Jude's ditch easement.' It instituted ajudicial mechanism for resolving the burdened owner and
the benefitted owner's competing property interests should the parties not agree
upon a change to the easement.'" The underlying property owner seeking to
unilaterally alter the ditch easement must demonstrate that (i) "the maintenance
rights of the owner of the ditch easement" are not "adversely affected by the
change," and (ii) "the water provided to the ditch easement owner must be of
the same quantity, quality, and timing as provided under the ditch owner's water
rights and easement rights in the ditch."'"
A ditch right-of-way for the conveyance of water to its place of use is a vested
property right'" So, too, is the water use right associated with the ditch." Both
are essential to Colorado's prior appropriation system for enforcement of adjudicated beneficial uses under the State's rule of law.
In St.Jude's II,
the Court rejected the Club's claim to turn the public's
natural strean into a private artificial stream. 6 The absolute decree application
sought a flow-through diversion from the Roaring Fork River for a half-mile
length of ditch." The Club claimed the beneficial purposes encompassed "aesthetic and recreational amenity to a golf course development, as well as for fish
habitat and as a private fly-fishing stream." 8 The Club characterized its need
for ditch-fall flows as a "piscatonial use" entailing a "challenging recreational
fishing experience. " "
The Court held such purposes are not among the beneficial use purposes
allowed under Colorado's water law.' The Court's opinion, authored byJustice
Nathan B. Coats, likens such a diversion to a forbidden riparian right.' The
opinion recites how the Colorado General Assembly carefully stewarded and
restricted public agency appropriations for instream flow and recreational inchannel beneficial uses, and determines such a ditch flow-through diversion is
wasteful, not beneficial, under the law:
The Club's proposed 'uses' of the water in question, as expressed in its application, cannot be beneficial within the meaning of the Act because the only
purpose they are offered to serve is the subjective enjoyment of the Club's
private guests. The flow of water necessary to elciendy produce beauty, excitement, or fun cannot even conceptually be quantified, and therefore where
these kinds of subjective experiences are recognized by the legislature to be
valuable, it has specifically provided for their public enjoyment, scientific ad-

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See id. at 1230
Id.at 1238.
Seeid.at 1238.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See St.Jude 's
II,
351 P.3d at 445.
Id.at 446.
Id.
Id.at 451.
Id.
Id.
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ministration, and careful measurement. See, e.g., § 37-92-102 (restricting appropriation of instrean flows and in-channel diversions to particular purposes
and amounts as determined by a state agency bound by fiduciary duty, and
with public participation). Without describing a purpose for the accomplishment of which a measurable amount of water, however approximate, must be
used, the Club, by definition, fails to articulate an intent to put the specidic
amount of water it claims to a beneficial use.

Recognition of the Club's proposed uses would substantially undernine the
intent evident in the legislature's instream flow and [Recreational In-Channel
Diversions] ("RICD") provisions. The General Assembly has taken great care
to limit recreational and environmental uses of water in-chamel, largely to deal
with the potential dangers and excesses inherent in capturing the flow of the
stream. The Club would indisputably be barred from appropriating rights for
its asserted uses were the water in question to remain in the natural course of
the Roaring Fork River. See sections 37-92-102(3), -103(4). In effect, the Club
seeks to accomplish by virtue of diversion what the legislature has expressly
prohibited instreamn: By using a diversion to effectively change the path of a
natural stream or a significant portion of it, the Club seeks approval for recreating a natural stream on its private property and adjudicating the rights to
enjoy the flows therein. This appropriation is tantamount to a 'forbidden riparian right.' Because an appropriation requires actual application of a portion of the waters of the state to a beneficial use,2 the Club cannot acquire such
2
a forbidden right simply by virtue of diversion.
The Court issued Justice Allison Eid's instream flow decision in Farmers
Water v. Colorado Water ConservationBoardonly two months before it sat to
That opinion gives effect to the General Assembly's deldecide SL Jude's I'
egation of quasi-legislative authority to a public agency for the appropriation of
flow rights. " These flow rights are restricted to certain reaches of the natural
stream under parameters containing articulated limitations, and in accordance
with a public comment process preceding the Colorado Water Conservation
Board's ("CWCB") water court application. Instream flow legislation forwards
"the public's interest in the preservation of the environment."' The CWCB
makes such a flow-right appropriation in the name of the people and carries
forth "a fiduciary duty arising out of the CWCB's unique statutory duties."'
The Court's St.Jude's Iopinion resounds in the limitations against excess
diversions, set forth originally in a 1876 ditch law, still codified in Section 3784-108: "During the summer season a person shall not run through his or her
irrigating ditch any greater quantity of water than is absolutely necessary for irrgating, domestic, and stock purposes to prevent the wasting and useless discharge and running away of water." 7 As Justice Coats pointed out, the flowthrough ditch diversion the Club claimed, in absence of a specific legislative

22.
23.
(2015).
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
See Farmers Water Dev. Co. v. Colorado Water Conservation Bd., 346 P.3d 52, 54
Id.
Id.at 58.
Id.
COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-84-108(1).
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authorization, contrasts markedly to the General Assembly's express authorization for a diversion impounded for recreational, fishery, or wildlife purposes
under Section 37-92-103(4)(a)."
St. Jude's I cannot be viewed as affecting or modifying, in any way, the
Court's holding in Upper Gunni'on, which approves the diversion, capture,
storage, and release of water in a specific amount followed by its subsequent
release into a reach of the stream, in order to manage and enhance fishery and
•recreational uses of the stream. In that case, the Court rejected an assertion
that such a beneficial use of the appropriated water impermissibly granted an
instream flow water right to an appropriator other than the CWCB." Rather,
St.Jude's I relies on a longstanding foundation of water law, that the mere
diversion of water of itself, does not establish a beneficial use.3 "The content
and boundaries of 'beneficial use' requires careful case-by-case factual analysis,"
even as the panoply of lawful beneficial uses continues to expand as case law
and statutory provisions plumb Colorado's changing economy and values.2
The troubling instance of a ditch being turned into a private fishing stream,
through the mere diversion of the waters of the natural steam into and through
the ditch, marks St. Jude's Has an outlier in Colorado's water jurisprudence.
Although the dissent in S. Jude's Irecites a contention in amicus briefs that
water courts have previously entered decrees for the very type of flow-through
purpose the Club claimed,'3 an examination of those individual decrees might
or might not support such an assertion. Regardless, the Court did not accept
an appeal in those cases testing the proposition. Whether or not there is a
successful collateral attack against a previously adjudicated un-appealed final
decree is a matter for further examination, if and when any person attempts to
set it aside."
IV. SMALL HYDRO USE: A BURDENED LANDOWNER'S OPPORTUNITY
The Court's Frees v. Tidddecision, also issued inJune 2015, addresses the
interplay of ditch rights and water rights as well. That decision upholds a junior
conditional water court decree for small hydropower use of water available at
the head gate of a ditch running water for the senior water rights holder's irrigation use.' There, the owner of property burdened by the ditch easement benefited from a guiding principle enunciated in St. Jude's I - that courts should
accommodate, where possible, the real property interests of both the dominant
and servient estates involved in a ditch and water rights dispute.

28.

S&Judce' II 351 P.3d at 449.

29. Bd. of Cnty Conin'ns of the Cnty of Arapahoe v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist., 838 P.2d 840, 849-50 (Colo. 1992).
30. 1d. at 854.
31. See Archuleta v. Gonez, 200 P.3d 333, 346 (Colo. 2009).
32. SeeVance v. Wolfe, 205 P.3d 1165, 1172 (Colo. 2009).
33. St.Jude's H, 351 P. 3d at 460.
34. San Antonio, Los Pinos mad Conjeos River Acequia Pres. Ass'n v. Special Improvement
Dist. No. 1 of the Rio Grande Water Conservation Dist., 351 P.3d 1112, 1123 (Colo. 2015).
35. Frees v. Tidd, 349 P.3d at 268; sec Christopher Ainscough, New OpporzuitiesforSmallscale Hydiopowerin Colorado,19 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 2 (Spring 2016).
36. SLJude's, 36 P.3d. 1229, 1237-38 (Colo. 2001).
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V. CONCLUSION

Beneficial use claims are not unbridled under Colorado water law. In instances involving a novel claim for an appropriative right, the state's supreme
court on direct appeal from one of the seven water courts looks to constitutional, statutory, and case law in determining whether or not the claimed use is
a legal use. Diverting water flow from a natural stream into, through, and out
of the ditch back to the river, purely for a private, aesthetic, recreational, and
challenging fly fishing experience, is a novel claim the Colorado Supreme Court
had not previously considered.

